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references that go towards pluralism, let me throw in three other volumes (Levy and
Peart, 2005; Caplan and Schotter, 2008; Banerjee and Duflo, 2012) as a way towards
“interaction, debate, openness and tolerance of others” (p. 579).
M. Ali Khan
The Johns Hopkins University
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Till Dűppe’s The Making of the Economy is, to my knowledge, the only attempt to seriously apply Edmund Husserl’s interwar phenomenological thinking to economics and its
history. The book is highly original, thought-provoking, and rich in its survey of the entire
history of economics. Husserl’s complaint against modern science (1970) is that it ‘forgets’
our immediate, pre-given ‘life-world’ (Lebenswelt-vergessenheit), and creates an abstract,
false world of objects and facts it investigates in an abstract (indeed, alienated1) way.
‘Scientification’ is an ‘objectification’; ‘nature’ is constructed; science is a history of accumulating facts (Tatsachengeschicte) whose justification is a hollow, scientific, realist progressivism. Husserl and phenomenology are Continental philosophy’s answer to logical
positivism and the whole twentieth-century philosophy of science tradition derived from
that starting point—which, it is worth noting, has also long been the way that the history of
economic methodology has been seen, or at least until the disjuncture caused by the rise of
the sociology of scientific knowledge and social constructivist thinking, as influenced by
people such as Steven Shapin. Thus, one definite service Dűppe provides is to encourage
us to take an unfamiliar and, in many respects, deeper philosophical look at how we
understand the evolution of the history of economics.
His title gives us economics’ particular form of scientific objectification: the economy
itself is something made. “The economy—one may quote me on this2—has never shown
1Husserl

thus follows in a long history of dialectical reasoning in terms of the alienation concept dating
back to Hegel.
2Okay, I will.
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itself, even if the government were on holiday” (p. 119). In this, he shares with Margaret
Schabas (2006) the view that ‘scientification’ in economics is associated with a denaturalization of economic life. The lived ‘natural’ world, the Lebenswelt, is a matter of human
concern prior to seventeenth-century British mercantilist economics, but after this
time—here, Dűppe especially follows William Letwin (1963)—the emergence of trade
and the disturbing manifestation of private interest drove a new liberal political economy
discourse, ultimately the science of wealth (J. S. Mill), whose crowning achievement
was to successfully dispel, at least temporarily, a ‘culture of suspicion’ surrounding the
new science over whether the world of the economy commonly worked to one’s
disadvantage.
Indeed, suspicion, the shadow of the suppressed and forgotten Lebenswelt, the
vague sense that economics misrepresents the world, is the principal theme in Dűppe’s
argument. This is the meaning of the painting on the book’s cover—Ein Notar (1542)
by Marinus van Reymerswaele—which shows a seemingly inconspicuous clerk in the
center of the picture recording an unhappy transaction between a money lender and a
poor debtor. The clerk’s persona is the one sought by the future economist, who seeks
the virtue of ‘blind sight’ (Daston and Galison 2007) associated with the anonymity of
a scientist concerned only with how ‘objective’ forces operate in the ‘economy.’ Yet,
suspicion persists, and so, for Dűppe, the evolving history of economics is built around
constructing an increasingly abstract structure lying beyond human interests and
removed from the world we experientially occupy. Here, then, it is Michel Foucault
who matters for Dűppe, because Foucault sees the development of science as inseparable from the development of authority. Economics, then, does more than simply
objectify; it governs and rules our perception of the Lebenswelt.
A few words about Dűppe’s periodization of the history of economics: the ‘first wave of
scientification of economic writings,’ liberal political economy, lasts until the 1840s, when
J. S. Mill and Karl Marx confront industrialization. The second wave, ‘high modernism,’
lasts from then until 1945. These two waves are described with much historical knowledge
and insight, but it is the third wave, the ‘formalist revolution’ (with its seed in the socialist
calculation debate), and the symbolic figure of Gerhard Debreu, that is of special interest
for current debates over the nature of economics (also cf. Dűppe 2012). What future might
economics then expect, having reached a pinnacle of abstraction? Here, Dűppe’s verdict is
not unremittingly pessimistic, but he also gives little reason for optimism. Might economics
thus be at the end of its alienated ‘life-cycle’? I won’t tell you how the story ends (indeed,
it cannot), but simply note that, for Dűppe, economics can only press the forgetting of
the Lebenswelt, never eliminate it as its basis.
A couple of issues: first, one criticism might be made of Dűppe’s phenomenological
argument. The central claim of the book is that economics has redirected and controlled our perception and thereby suppressed the Lebenswelt, the lived natural world
of which we are part. But one could ask: why isn’t the objectified world our real
Lebenswelt? And why shouldn’t our own Lebenswelt be different from that which we
imagine occupied the pre-modern world? Second, why not include phenomenologist
Maurice Merleau-Ponty in this account?
However, whatever one’s view is of Dűppe’s overall arguments, he is surely to be
commended for his impressive knowledge of the history of economics, which exceeds
that of not a few more senior scholars. And his writing a whole history also prompts
us to ask: where are the ambitious histories of economics among the publications of
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historians of economics today? Indeed, who any longer debates the major interpretations
of the history of economics in our contemporary small-scale culture of journal publication? Do historians today even recognize that historiographic form that once made an
issue of how the history of economics is to be interpreted, such as occupied such
great historians as Edwin Cannan, Erich Roll, Henry William Spiegel, Warren Samuels,
and so many others of two generations past?
John B. Davis
Marquette University and University of Amsterdam
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The diverse studies collected in The Empire of Credit, ranging over both monetary and
financial history and the history of monetary theory, share a common theme: the interaction between the fiscal requirements of national defense and the rapid evolution of
monetary and financial institutions from the late seventeenth century to the early nineteenth century, the period in which Great Britain unexpectedly displaced France as the
chief European military power, while gaining a far-flung intercontinental empire, only
modestly diminished by the loss of thirteen American colonies in 1783. What enabled
that interaction to produce such startling results were economies achieved by substituting
bank-supplied money (banknotes and, increasingly, bank deposits) for gold and silver.
The world leader in the creation of these new instruments, Britain reaped the benefits
of reduced transactions costs while simultaneously creating a revenue source (through
the establishment of the Bank of England) that could be tapped by the Crown and
Parliament to fund the British military, thereby enabling conquests against rivals
(especially France) that lagged behind Britain in the development of flexible monetary
institutions.
Though flexible, British monetary arrangements were based on a commitment to a
fixed value of sterling in terms of gold, a commitment that avoided both the disastrous
consequences of John Law’s brilliant, but ill-fated, monetary schemes in France, and

